2026 REPORT
Refugees in Spain and Europe
© Jaime Alekos / CEAR
Refugees in 2025
CEAR’s 24th Annual Report analyzes the situation of refugees worldwide, in the European Union, and, primarily, in Spain. This year, the figures for forced displacement fell for the first time in a decade. However, this decline does not reflect reduced protection needs; rather, it is the result of the rise of anti-migration policies worldwide.
In this report, we analyze the situation in the main countries of origin of refugees and displaced persons, as well as the main obstacles they face during their migration journeys and in reception and inclusion processes, among other things.
© Diego Menjíbar
1. GLOBAL EXODUS
Global forced displacement figures
Main displacement crises and host countries worldwide
© Abed al-Hakeem Abu Reyash
Palestinian Refugees: special reference to the situation in the region
2025 was a particularly bleak year for the Palestinian population in Gaza. A ceasefire was declared early in the year but was quickly violated unilaterally due to an escalation of Israeli hostilities in March. Just a few weeks earlier, Israel had imposed a total blockade on humanitarian aid. In May, with U.S. collaboration, it established a humanitarian aid distribution scheme—the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation—to replace official mechanisms. In August, famine was officially declared in the Strip for the first time. Against this backdrop, a Peace Agreement was reached in November 2025, based on the U.S. 20-Point Plan and endorsed by the UN Security Council. However, numerous independent experts and civil society actors point out that this significantly undermines the Palestinian people’s inalienable right to self determination.
© Diego Herrera
2. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND REFUGEES
Migration routes to the EU
In 2025, the number of irregular arrivals in Europe dropped to 158,003, a 24% decrease from 2024. The sharpest drop occurred on the Atlantic route to the Canary Islands, which saw 62% fewer arrivals than in 2024. As in 2024, 91% of arrivals occurred by sea. Spain, Italy, and Greece remained the main destinations for another year.
This decrease is not linked to a reduction in danger: sea routes to Europe continue to have high mortality rates, with a total of 2,504 deaths and disappearances in 2025. As in 2024, the majority of these (53%) occurred in the Central Mediterranean.
Asylum figures
A total of 822,000 people applied for international protection in the EU, 19% fewer than in 2024. Once again, Germany received the most applications, despite a 31% decline. Spain dropped to third place, with France receiving the second-highest number of applications. Those seeking asylum came primarily from Afghanistan, Venezuela, and Syria.
The external dimension of the European Pact on Migration and Asylum
In 2025, a series of critical debates took place regarding the EPMA’s external dimension. The outcome of these negotiations was a deepening of the pact’s security-oriented approach through measures that erode the right to asylum and the dignity of migrants and refugees.
One of the most controversial issues is the expansion of the concept of “safe third country,” which allows Member States to reject international protection applications based on generalized assumptions without conducting an individualized examination of the merits of each case.
Also in this vein, the new Return Regulation is currently under debate; it aims to increase the number of returns and accelerate the process for carrying them out, resorting to measures such as prolonged detention.
© Jaime Alekos / CEAR
3. Right to asylum in Spain
More than just numbers
Spain was the third-largest recipient of international protection applications in the EU, with 144,396 applications, although this figure is significantly smaller than in 2024 (167,366, – 13.7%). In 2025, the Sahel joined Latin America and West Africa as one of the main regions of origin for asylum seekers: Venezuela remained the top country of origin, while Mali took Colombia’s spot (which fell to third place) as the second-largest country of origin. These countries were followed by Peru, Senegal, and Morocco, which show a sharp decline. Palestine, Nicaragua, Somalia, and Guinea round out the top ten countries.
These declines are due to the entry into force of the new Immigration Regulation in May 2025, which had a deterrent effect on the filing of international protection applications by nationals of countries with traditionally low recognition rates.
The international protection recognition rate in Spain fell sharply from 18.5% to 11.2%, in line with the historic low for asylum application recognition in the EU in 2025.
In total, 160,663 cases were resolved, a 67% increase compared to 2024. This increase corresponds to a more modest reduction in the number of pending applications (9.6%).
11,2%
Protection recognition rate
9,6%
Applications pending resolution
The Pros and cons of the amendment to the Regulations of the Organic Law on Immigration (RELOEx)
© Jaime Alekos / CEAR
On the one hand, the amendment to the RELOEx excluded the time a person has spent as an international protection applicant from the residency eligibility calculation, except in the case of family ties. This discouraged the filing of applications that might otherwise have been approved and pushed migrants into administrative irregularity, making them more vulnerable and more socially and legally excluded and invisible.
On the other hand, the transitional regime for those whose international protection applications had been rejected before May 2025 forced these individuals to withdraw their appeals, even when they believed the decisions might be unjust, for fear of missing the opportunity to expedite their regularization process.
© Borja Suárez
4. Southern border
In 2025, 62% fewer arrivals were recorded on this route than in 2024 (17,788 versus 29,055) due to border externalization policies in countries such as Senegal and Mauritania. Within this framework of migration control, a fragmentation of traditional routes was also observed, with Mauritania being replaced by Gambia, southern Morocco, Guinea-Conakry, and Senegal.
Despite the drastic drop in arrivals via this route, the territorial distribution of these arrivals across the archipelago’s islands is identical to that of 2024: El Hierro had by far the most arrivals, followed by Lanzarote, Gran Canaria, Fuerteventura, and Tenerife. La Gomera maintained a marginal level of arrivals, while there were none on La Palma.
The main nationalities of origin in 2025 remained Mali and Senegal. This year, Senegal overtook Mali as the main country of origin by just 124 people.
Migrant children continue to be a significant presence on this route, accounting for 15% of all arrivals via this route, most unaccompanied. In the Canary Islands, despite the decline in arrivals, the chronic overwhelm of cases of unaccompanied migrant minors remains a gap in their protection. In 2025, a mechanism was established to distribute migrant minors from overburdened autonomous communities, and the central government assumed responsibility for those who were asylum seekers. As a result, the Canary Islands went from caring for 5,566 unaccompanied minors at the beginning of 2025 to 4,506 by the end of the year.
In Ceuta, arrivals by land increased by 39.2% compared to 2024 (a total of 3,523 people), while arrivals by sea dropped to just 4 people. Most of these arrivals were made by swimming, including children, from Morocco. The main countries of origin include Morocco, Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. Attempts to cross the border, though less frequent but still ongoing, are mostly made by people from the Sahel and West Africa.
In Melilla, the increase in arrivals by land—most of them by swimming—was much more dramatic than in Ceuta (an increase of 181.9%). In this case, the proportion of young people, adolescents, and children of Moroccan nationality is higher.
© Bruno Thevenin
5. Reception and inclusion
Special attention to unaccompanied minors
Attention to unaccompanied minors seeking international protection was one of the year’s main challenges. Serious structural shortcomings persist, such as the lack of standardized procedures to assess the specific protection needs of minors and the invisibility of vulnerabilities such as trafficking, violence, and mental health issues, which continue to go unaddressed in a holistic manner by the asylum system.
Furthermore, throughout 2025, CEAR assisted minors with urgent healthcare needs who were evacuated from Gaza. CEAR actively supported these families by providing housing, legal guidance, psychological support, and comprehensive assistance. However, constant transfers, administrative delays, and, above all, the impossibility of reuniting with family members who remained in Gaza, effectively prevented the exercise of the right to family reunification, thus exacerbating the suffering of people who bear the profound physical and mental scars of the campaign of genocide.
© César Dezfuli
The Impact of racism and xenophobia on effective access to ESCR
Racism and xenophobia constitute structural barriers that limit the effective access of international protection applicants and beneficiaries to economic, social, and cultural rights. This discrimination, which is present in access to housing and employment and institutional treatment, fosters mistrust, isolation, and exclusion, and is exacerbated by the proliferation of hate speech online.
© Guillem Trius
6. Proposals
Proposals
7. To learn more
Normalizing hate: racist discourse and its impact on migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees
In recent years, hate speech has intensified in the public sphere, particularly targeting migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees. This type of rhetoric not only influences how society perceives them but also directly affects their living conditions.
The forced displacement of the Sahrawi population and the transfer of settlers to Western Sahara considering international law
November 14, 2025, marked the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Madrid Agreements between Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania, which initiated Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara and the structural transformation of the territory’s ethnic composition.
© Nuria López Torres
Materials
