BORDER EXTERNALIZATION AND MIGRATION CONTROL IN ALGERIA: RISKS FOR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
This report has been drawn up by the advocacy area at the Spanish Commission for Refugees (CEAR) in the context of the ‘Observatory on the right to asylum, forced migrations and frontiers’ project funded by the Extremadura Agency for International Development Cooperation (AEXCID).

During the research and in order to make an analysis of the impact of externalization of borders and cooperation for development linked to migratory control in Argelia, the CEAR team held meetings and interviews with Alarm Phone Sahara, Augusto Delkáder (researcher UCM), CONCORD, CONGDE, Euromed Monitor, EuroMed Rights, EUTF, FIIAPP, OXFAM INTERMON, IRIDIA, Javier Roldán (professor UGR), LADDH, Laurence Thieux (professor UCM), MAEC-MAUC, OIM, Pepe Naranjo (journalist on El País) and migrants or asylum seekers, to whom CEAR thanks their contributions to conduct this report.

Front page photo: Jijel (Algeria)
© Image courtesy of a refugee to CEAR.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Acronyms</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Context</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Relations and cooperation with the EU on migration and development aid</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Relations and cooperation with Spain</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1. Evolution of Official Development Assistance from Spain in Algeria</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Migration, border management and conditionality</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1. Algeria as a country of origin: migration and refuge</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2. Algeria as a country of destination and transit: the situation of migrants and refugees in Algeria</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.1 Legal framework on migration and asylum</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.2 Assistance and support for migrants and refugees</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.3 Arrests and expulsions in Algeria</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3. Conditionality in migration</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Conclusions</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexes</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Evolution of the number of international protection seekers, refugees and asylum seekers in Algeria</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Monthly detections of Algerians on the western Mediterranean route</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Acronyms

**AECID**: Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation  
**AU**: African Union  
**CE**: European Comission  
**CIE**: Foreign Internment Centres  
**CNDH**: National Comission of Human Rights (Algeria)  
**EU**: European Union  
**EUROSTAT**: European Statistical  
**EUTF**: European Trust Fund for Africa  
**FAD**: Development Aid Fund  
**FIEM**: Corporate Internalization Fund  
**FIIAPP**: Fundación Internacional y para Iberoamérica de Administración y Políticas Públicas  
**FRONTEX**: European Border and Coast Guard Agency  
**ICEX**: Spanish Institute of Foreign Trade  
**ICMPD**: International Centre for Migration Policy Development  
**IDC/DCI**: Development Cooperation Instrument  
**IEDDH**: European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)  
**IEV/ENI**: European Neighborhood Instrument  
**INE**: National Institute of Statistics  
**NDCI-Global Europe**: Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument  
**MAEC/MAUC**: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development/ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UE and Development  
**MoU**: Memorandum of Understanding  
**IOM**: International Organization of Migrations  
**ILO**: International Labor Organization  
**NGO**: Non-governmental Organization  
**UN**: United Nations  
**ODA**: Official Development Assistance  
**PACI**: Plan Annual de Cooperation International  
**PD**: Master Plan of the Spanish Cooperation  
**RAN**: High-Level Meeting  
**TABVC**: Treaty of friendship, good neighborly relations and cooperation  
**TAIEX**: Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument  
**UNHCR**: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
1. Introduction

When it comes to migration, Algeria is a crucial country for the European Union and Spain as it is currently one of the leading countries of origin and transit for arriving migrants and refugees. It has also traditionally been an important country of destination within Africa.

Reluctant to officially follow the European guidelines for migration control, Algeria exercises a harsh migration policy a priori, affecting nationals who are readmitted (and condemned) and migrants from third countries (who are detained, judged, and expelled), often defying its own laws and agreements, as well as the international treaties it has signed.

Development cooperation with Spain and the EU does not play a notable role in Algeria. Cooperation from the EU is focused on technical assistance. National EUTF projects are not carried out in the country. Regarding Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Spain, the country has lost relevance as a recipient of such aid since 2012. This is reflected in the amount disbursed and the country’s exclusion from being considered a priority country in cooperation master plans since 2013.

Given this context, and in line with its objective to defend human rights and the right to asylum, the Spanish Commission for Refugees (CEAR) conducted an investigation in 2021 as part of the ‘Observatory on the right to asylum, migrations and borders’ project. The study aimed to analyse the impact of border externalisation and conditional development cooperation policies in priority transit countries (Mauritania, Senegal and Algeria) on Spanish migration, asylum and development cooperation policies. The work was carried out based on the analysis and review of bibliographic sources and interviews with various key actors such as institutions and official bodies, NGOs, migrants/refugees, journalists, researchers and academics.

2. Context

Algeria, officially the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, is the largest country by area in Africa and 11th in the world. It has oscillating autarkic tendencies and aspirations to regional leadership within Africa. Due to its geographical location and hydrocarbon wealth, it is a key partner for the EU and Spain and a difficult one.

Algeria’s status as a country of origin, destination, and transit has varied over time: since its colonisation by the French, frequent migration flows to and from France have been frequent. After gaining independence, there was mass migration to France, which slowed down in the 1970s due to the imposition of restrictions. Later, the Algerian Civil War in the 1990s and a series of crises in recent years have maintained Algeria’s status as a country of origin for migrants. On the other hand, it has also been a country of destination for migrants of several nationalities, especially in periods of economic boom. In recent years, the situation in Libya and Tunisia has led to an increase in migration flows from Central and West Africa to Algeria, either as a destination or as a place of transit on the migration route to Europe.

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1 It has a surface area of 2,381,741 km² (however, more than 80% is desert), with 6,734 km of land border and 1,200 km of coastline. It borders Morocco to the west (1,941 km of border), Mauritania (460 km) to the southwest, Mali (1,359 km) and Niger (951 km) to the south, and Libya (989 km) and Tunisia (1,034 km) to the east. In 2020, it had a population of 43,851,043 inhabitants. CIA Factbook. Algeria. Nov. 2021. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/algeria/
3. Relations and cooperation with the EU on migration and development aid

Regarding relations with the EU, as a member of the Union for the Mediterranean (UPM)- and a partner of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Algeria has an Association Agreement (AA) with the EU that has been in force since September of 2005.

This agreement was aimed at progressively establishing a free trade area. However, according to the Spanish Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism website, ‘Algeria has not further strengthened its trade relations with the EU’ and, since 2016, they have been hindered by Algeria’s adoption of restrictive measures that are not compatible with the agreement.

The agreement also addresses other issues such as migration. In this regard, Article 72 of the agreement provides for the maintenance of a regular dialogue on the following issues, especially to cover problems related to living and working conditions, migration, ‘illegal immigration’ and the conditions governing the return of people in this situation, as well as the promotion of equal treatment and mutual understanding, tolerance and non-discrimination between Algerians and Community nationals.

During the Association Council of March 2017, the EU and Algeria adopted their partnership priorities for 2017-2020, which encompassed ‘the human dimension, including cultural and inter religious dialogue, migration and mobility’. At the following Council, in May 2018, specific migration issues were discussed, including, among others: legal channels and cooperation against human trafficking. At a later meeting in

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2 The Union for the Mediterranean (UPM), created in 2008 to revitalise the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, constitutes a regional cooperation framework between the EU Member States and 15 Mediterranean countries, including the 10 Southern neighbours.
3 The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) applies to Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Palestine and Tunisia (Southern neighbours) and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (Eastern Neighbours). It is aimed at strengthening prosperity, stability and security for all. It is based on democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. It is a bilateral policy between the EU and each partner country, complemented by regional collaboration initiatives: the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean. See: EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. (2021). ENP Factsheet. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/es/sheet/170/la-politica-europea-de-vecindad#_ftn1]
5 Ministry of Trade website. EU trade policy. Algeria. [https://comercio.gob.es/PoliticaComercialUE/AcuerdosComerciales/Paginas/Argelia.aspx]
6 As a result of the controversial closure of the gas pipeline running from Algeria to Spain via Morocco, Algeria has requested a review of the Agreement, arguing that it leaves its country in a disadvantaged situation. [https://www.20minutos.es/noticia/4875294/0/argelia-pide-revisar-clausula-por-clausula-el-acuerdo-de-asociacion-con-la-union-europea/?autoref=true]
7 Article 74 of the EU-ALGERIA ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT. (2005). (Op. cit) also gives priority status to actions and programmes aimed at improving living conditions, especially in migration areas; reinserting persons repatriated due to their illegal status; investing in or creating companies in Algeria by Algerian workers; promoting the social role of women in the development process; improving the health and social protection system; implementing and funding exchange and leisure programmes for mixed groups of young people; improving living conditions in disadvantaged areas; promoting socio-professional dialogue; promoting respect for human rights in the socio-professional framework; contributing to the development of the housing sector, in particular to social housing; mitigating the negative consequences of adjusting economic and social structures; improving the vocational training system.
8 The partnership priorities adopted under the framework of the Association Agreement between the EU and Algeria up until 2020 are as follows: political dialogue, governance, the rule of law and the promotion of fundamental rights; cooperation, socio-economic development, including trade and access to the European single market; energy, the environment and sustainable development; strategic and security dialogue; the human dimension, including cultural and inter-religious dialogue, migration and mobility. See: EU Council. 13/04/2017. Press release: The European Union and Algeria adopt their Partnership Priorities: [https://www_consilium.europa.eu/es/press/press-releases/2017/03/13/eu-algeria/]
10 Migration flows are treated as a ‘subject of mutual interest in terms of economic, cultural and social development’ recognising, however, that ‘unless they are adequately controlled, such flows may also present challenges, in particular given the links between irregular migration and criminal activities.’ The two parties intend to improve their dialogue to make the most of legal channels for mobility within the framework of a comprehensive approach and a positive agenda, while [...] pursuing their efforts to combat the criminal networks which organise trafficking in human beings [...] ensuring respect for international law, including human rights.
On the other hand, they recognise that, in the long term, the only means to reduce and control this phenomenon is to achieve a stable regional context, respect for human dignity and the requisite socio-economic development. They also agreed to work together to settle the conflicts and crises in the region, which are sometimes the source of irregular migration. See: Joint press release on the occasion of the 11th session of the EU-Algeria Association Council (Op.cit).
December 2020, migration was once again emphasised, highlighting the importance of strengthening the agreements for the return of people in an irregular situation and expressing the EU’s readiness to play its role in addressing the root causes of irregular migration. 

Development cooperation is included in these ‘mutually beneficial’ partnerships in which political, economic, trade, energy, environmental, security and migration interests are all intertwined.

In terms of aid funding, Algeria receives EU development cooperation funds through the following instruments:

a. The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) -- through which the aforementioned European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is funded since it includes migration and mobility -- is limited to technical and financial cooperation. This was the EU’s main funding instrument for bilateral cooperation with Southern partners for 2014-2020 (of the €1.54 billion available for this instrument, €241.3 million were allocated to Algeria in that period). 

Among its cooperation tools, 26 twinning projects were carried out with Algeria, as well as 61 TAIEX events (Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument).

Regarding the EU’s new Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI - Global Europe), €19.32 billion will be allocated to the Neighbourhood, including Algeria.

b. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). The Fund does not finance any programmes exclusive to Algeria, but it does sponsor regional projects as part of the North Africa item, which includes Algeria. Therefore, Algeria receives funds (€8.9 million) through five regional programs to improve migration management.

According to sources consulted from the EUTF, Algeria has chosen not to be a beneficiary of the funds allocated to migration management of the Central and Western Mediterranean routes included in the framework of the Fund.

12 Neighbourhood instrument website: [https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/south/stay-informed/algeria]
cierapara-los-proximos-dos-anos]
14 Twinning is a cooperation mechanism of the European Union that consists of transmitting good public administration practices to third countries. It was initially focused on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to facilitate their accession to the Union but have also been extended to the countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy. In Algeria, 26 twinning projects were carried out from 2014 to 2020 in the sectors of agriculture and fisheries, environment, finance, internal market and economy, justice and home affairs, nuclear safety, energy, social affairs and employment, standardisation and certification, trade and industry, telecommunications and transport.
To learn how this tool works, read this interview [https://www.fiiapp.org/cooperacion-programas-de-hermanamiento-de-la-union-europea/] or visit the European Commission website [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/tenders/twinning_en]
15 La asistencia TAIEX está dirigida a: funcionarios públicos de las administraciones centrales; las autoridades judiciales y policiales; parlamentos y funcionarios de los parlamentos y los cuerpos legislativos; representantes de socios sociales económicos, sindicatos y patronales. El TAIEX no da apoyo directo a la sociedad civil, ciudadanos o empresas. Véase página de la CE sobre fondos destinados a vecindad: [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/funding-and-technical-assistance/taieux_en, página de la CE sobre vecindad: [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/tenders/taieux_en_o_video explicativo https://vimeo.com/75149734]
16 The total budget (for cooperation with all third countries) is €79.5 billion for 2021-2027. Almost 25% of that would be allocated to neighbour countries.
18 Response to questions sent in writing to the EUTF office.
Table 1. REGIONAL EUTF PROGRAMMES THAT INCLUDE ALGERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name and date adopted</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>EUTF disbursement</th>
<th>Partner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean City-to-City Migration (MC2CM) – Phase II 01/04/2018</td>
<td>Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Libya</td>
<td>€ 5.550.000</td>
<td>ICMPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility for Migrant Protection and Reintegration in North Africa 04/12/2017</td>
<td>Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and Egypt</td>
<td>€ 10.000.000</td>
<td>OIM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dismantling the criminal networks operating in North Africa and involved in migrant smuggling and human trafficking 04/12/2017</td>
<td>Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and Egypt</td>
<td>€ 15.500.000</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (ONUDC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards a Holistic Approach to Labour Migration Governance and Labour Mobility in North Africa¹⁹ 13/12/2018</td>
<td>Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and Egypt</td>
<td>€ 20.000.000 Co-financed by the German Coop. Min.: 5.000.000</td>
<td>ENABEL, OIT, GIZ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own creation based on information from the EUTF website of the European Commission²⁰

c. Other instruments and initiatives, such as the ‘European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 2000–2006 (IEDDH)’ or the ‘Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)’.

Lastly, it should be noted that, unlike other nearby countries such as Morocco or Tunisia, Algeria does not receive funding from the Mobility Partnership Facility (MPF), dedicated to migration management (surveillance, visas and trafficking in human beings) as it has not signed any mobility agreements (MP) or Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility with the EU under the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM).

¹⁹ Technical cooperation. According to the description on the EUTF website, the programme ‘will contribute to improving the governance of labour migration and the protection of migrant workers in North Africa by supporting the development and implementation of coherent and comprehensive policy frameworks guided by relevant human rights and labour standards and based on reliable data and evidence’.


21 Following the expiry of Regulations No. 975/1999 (developing countries) and 976/1999 (other third countries) of the Council of the European Union, which served as the legal basis for the activities carried out under the Initiative, this was replaced by the Financing Instrument for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights in the World (2007 – 2013). See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ES/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3A%3A10110

22 Through this instrument, €8 million were allocated to Algeria from 2014 to 2020 for the ‘Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities’ (CSO-LA) initiative, which aims to strengthen civil society organisations and local authorities. The restrictions on the right of association and the arrests of activists and members of civil society that have been taking place in recent years are proof of the need for this initiative in the country.

Note that an indicative figure of 7% DCI was allocated to migration and asylum, although in the case of Algeria, the funds seem to have been limited to the aforementioned programme.

For more information about the instrument and the program, see:


4. Relations and cooperation with Spain

Algeria is a strategic partner for Spain from the perspective of energy, trade, migration and security.

Relations between Spain and Algeria are based primarily on the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation (TFNC) signed in 2002 and in force since 2003. In 2002, the countries also decided to hold high-level meetings (HLM) at a bilateral level.

Under the framework of the TFNC and following the seven HLMs held since then, Spain and Algeria work in close cooperation in various key sectors such as the fight against terrorism, the fight against irregular migration and drug trafficking and the military. They have also signed numerous declarations, treaties and bilateral agreements, including some 40 Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) since 2007 on various subjects (migration, energy, education, fishing, infrastructure, transport, health, etc.).

| TABLE 2. MAIN AGREEMENTS BETWEEN SPAIN AND ALGERIA |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|

Spain is one of the countries that exports most to Algeria (especially in vehicles, machinery, metals, paper and electrical material) and the third that imports the most. In 2019, France was Algeria’s main client (representing 14.1% of total sales or $4,619 billion), followed by Italy (12.0%), and then Spain (11.2%).

Spanish companies interested in doing business with Algeria come from diverse sectors, including construction, infrastructure and energy. According to statements by the Spanish ambassador to Algeria in 2021, more than 500 Spanish companies were present, and according to the ICEX economic report of December 2020, there are a total of almost 300 Spanish-Algerian projects in very diverse sectors. The stock of Algerian investments in Spain between 1993 and 2019 totalled €342 million, with the investments of MEDGAZ standing out.


25 Spain is one of the countries that exports most to Algeria (especially in vehicles, machinery, metals, paper and electrical material) and the third that imports the most. In 2019, France was Algeria’s main client (representing 14.1% of total sales or $4,619 billion), followed by Italy (12.0%), and then Spain (11.2%).


27 LA MONCLOA. 02/04/2018. ress dossier prepared by the Secretary of State for Press. 7th High Level Meeting between Spain and Algeria. https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/presidente/Paginas/Dossierprensa/020418-argelia.aspx

28 The 8th HLM is still pending. The agenda includes working on opening regular and orderly channels of legal migration into Spain for entrepreneurs, students and workers and addressing irregular migration from the Sahel. SWISSINFO, 02/03/2021. Argelia y España anuncian la celebración de la 8ª reunión de alto nivel. https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/argelia-esp%C3%A1-la-argelia-y-espa%C3%B1a-anuncian-la-celebraci%C3%B3n-de-la-8%C2%AA-reunion%C3%B3n-de-alto-nivel/44414776

29 Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) are informal instruments for establishing agreements and represent an essential foreign policy instrument due to their flexibility and lack of oversight. They deal with all sorts of matters such as education, trade, economic matters, security issues, maritime control, repatriations or returns, and many of them are not public. They are established in Law 25/2003, of 27 November, on Treaties and other International Agreements, which mentions them under the name of ‘non-regulatory international agreements’ (MoUs), defined as ‘international agreements that do not constitute a treaty nor an international administrative agreement between the State, Government, bodies, agencies and entities of the General State Administration, … and any other subject of public law with the competence to enter such an agreement, and which contain declarations of intent or establish political, technical or logistical action commitments, and do not constitute a source of international obligations nor are they governed by International Law’.


4.1. Evolution of Official Development Assistance from Spain in Algeria

Development cooperation relations between Spain and Algeria are based on the Framework Agreement on Scientific, Technical, Cultural and Educational Cooperation of 1993—–the origins of which date back to a 1968 agreement—–and the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation, which entered into force in 2003. The Technical Cooperation Office (OTC) was established in Algiers that same year—–.

Algeria’s importance in the Spanish Cooperation Master Plans has dwindled over time, going from priority country in the first three plans— to only being mentioned in relation to the Saharawi territories in the Fourth MP (2013–2017) and Fifth MP (2018–2021)—–.

31 Except for agreements that appear with a publication date in the BOE, the rest of the MoUs or agreements are not public. Over the course of our research, we requested the content of nine agreements with Algeria from the Ministries of the Presidency, Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs and Defence through the Transparency Portal, and we received five of them. It should be noted that the Civil Guard-Gendarmerie Nationale cooperation agreements and the Civil Guard cooperation agreement with the Algerian National Coast Guard Service (on illicit traffic by sea, illegal migration and marine pollution) expressly requested from the Ministry of Home Affairs were not provided as they are classified as ‘secret’ or ‘confidential’.

32 We do not know the content of this. See previous note.

33 See previous note.


37 The name given to this priority interest varies according to the plans: ‘programme country’ in the First Master Plan (2001–2004); ‘priority country’ in the Second Master Plan (2005–2008); ‘group A country: comprehensive partnership countries’ in the Third Master Plan (2009–2012).

38 Nor does it receive special mention in any of the three Africa Plans (AP)—–plans for foreign action by Spain in Africa—drawn up between 2006 and 2019. In the First AP, it is only referred to as being part of the G8; in the Second AP, it is mentioned exclusively in a footnote as a country that is a friend of the Alliance of Civilizations; and in the Third PA, reference is made to it only as a reminder of the agreements it has signed with Spain on crime and terrorism and the fact that Spain obtains 50% of its gas from the country. Despite this, in Africa Focus—Third AP action programme—Algeria is expressly mentioned as a priority within the framework of strategic economic intervention (businesses and investments).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority in each Master Plan</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Net aid disbursed (bilateral only) in €</th>
<th>Net aid disbursed (bilateral and multilateral) in €</th>
<th>Gross aid disbursed (bilateral and multilateral) in €</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Master Plan: PROGRAMME Country</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>37,134,941</td>
<td>10,180,413</td>
<td>37,134,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>17,872,336</td>
<td>24,959,901</td>
<td>24,959,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>10,180,413</td>
<td>24,959,901</td>
<td>24,959,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>34,602,999</td>
<td>36,852,439</td>
<td>65,292,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>40,367,607</td>
<td>43,323,483</td>
<td>45,864,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>44,053,258</td>
<td>44,504,061</td>
<td>48,875,684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>6,944,291</td>
<td>7,194,291</td>
<td>12,206,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>-4,081,282</td>
<td>-439,701</td>
<td>10,759,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1,562,626</td>
<td>-24,445,140</td>
<td>1,562,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Master Plan: Included in the priority region 'North Africa' referring to the Saharawi population as a 'priority country' (sic).</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>-12,155,096</td>
<td>-12,155,096</td>
<td>5,762,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>864,327</td>
<td>864,327</td>
<td>864,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>-24,552,518</td>
<td>-24,552,518</td>
<td>1,829,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>-22,380,992</td>
<td>-22,380,992</td>
<td>4,004,950</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>-22,491,805</td>
<td>3,890,110</td>
<td>3,890,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Master Plan: Algeria is not a priority country, The Saharawi population is.</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>5,184,042</td>
<td>5,184,042</td>
<td>5,184,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>7,833,082</td>
<td>7,833,082</td>
<td>7,833,082</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own creation based on various sources: OXFAM-INTERMON, PACI 2001-2014 and Master Plans for Spanish Cooperation.

The following should be highlighted within the development cooperation aid allocated to Algeria:

a. Bilateral aid

This channel is used when development cooperation activities are carried out by the public administrations of the donor country with the recipient country, either through partner governments or other local public or private actors (which could be called direct bilateral aid), or through entities of the donor country (indirect bilateral) or through international organisations (multibilateral aid).
From 2006 to 2009, Algeria received €161 million in bilateral ODA from Spain, of which more than €147 million comprised gross disbursements of bilateral credits from the Development Aid Fund (DAF) for rail transport by the Ministry of Industry. Thus, this ministry played a major role in development cooperation with Algeria for 10 years: during the aforementioned period due to the credit disbursements, and in the following four years (2010-2014) and 2016, due to the reimbursement of these credits, which explains the negative figures.

The aforementioned importance of the Ministry of Industry is in stark contrast with that of the MAEC/MAUC (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation), which allocated €53 million from 2004 to 2019, standing alone as the first donor of ODA from 2010 to 2014.

In recent years (2015-2019), there has been a curious anomaly: despite not being a priority country in the corresponding Master Plans, the sum allocated to Algeria was higher than in previous periods. This is partially due to the fact that most of the disbursements of the total ODA granted to Algeria during these years (83% in 2019 and 76% in 2018) were allocated to items managed by the Ministry of Labour and designated to serve Algerian migrants arriving in national territory.

As for the Ministry of the Interior, it is worth noting that according to the data in the info@od application, names such as ‘Scientific and Technical Cooperation’; ‘Police Cooperation with Other Countries’; ‘Police Cooperation Activities’; ‘International Police Cooperation’ appeared between 2004 and 2018. The annual figures allocated to these police cooperation activities are reflected, for a total of €767,425 in that period—comparatively low as regards other countries.

b. Delegated cooperation

The International and Ibero-American Foundation for Administration and Public Policies (FIIAPP) has been developing delegated cooperation programmes for the EU and the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECID) for years. In total, they have developed 28 projects to date, 13 of which have been developed exclusively in Algeria and the other 15 at the regional or multi-country level.

In this sense, in the area of migration and mobility, the EU-funded projects ‘Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment’, which consisted of the organisation of various dialogue meetings, and

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45 The Development Aid Fund (DAF) was designed as a financial mechanism for development aid that would also offer parallel support to Spanish companies in their internationalisation. This so-called ‘aid’ granted concessional credits to developing countries to fund projects equipped with Spanish goods and services. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD questioned the effectiveness and true contribution to development of tied aid. For more information: EMPRESA GLOBAL (2010). Nuevo instrumento financiero de apoyo a la internacionalización de la empresa española el FIEM. https://www.empresaglobal.es/EGAPI/descargas/1037292/1601149/nuevo-instrumento-financiero-de-aypoa-la-internacionalizacion-de-la-empresa-espanola-el-fiem.pdf


47 Through this application, the General Secretariat for International Development Cooperation (GSIDC) collects information on official development assistance flows from Spain. Based on this information, a Monitoring Report on these flows is published annually and submitted to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. https://infoaod-info.maec.es/frontend/portada/seccion/anexos

48 As part of this research project, we requested the figures and content of the development cooperation projects managed by the Ministry of the Interior through the Spanish Government’s transparency portal. The resolution we received in response to the query contained no data on projects implemented in Algeria, on the understanding that their duty to transparency did not apply to this response, since ‘the framework of this aid covers actions related to national and public security, as well as international relations developed by the Kingdom of Spain’.

Response date 09/21/2021 to request 001-060490 made as part of our research.

49 23 of these 28 FIIAPP projects have been funded by the European Commission, four by AECID and one by the Ministry of Development.

50 The information provided on the aim of this project on the FIIAPP website is limited to the following statement: ‘By organising several meetings for discussions, the project seeks to encourage active participation by all the main promoters of this partnership and other regional processes in a constructive dialogue’. In the 2013 report, it expands on this somewhat, mentioning that ‘Through the organisation of various meetings, the aim is to promote dialogue and the exchange of experiences in the management of Africa-Europe migrations’. The project works with governments in four strategic areas: migration, mobility, employment and higher education. Examples of topics covered include access to international protection for refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons; the role of the regional economic communities, and the improvement of professional training. FIIAPP Report 2013. https://www.fiapp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/memoria-2013-pdf.pdf
the ‘EUROMED II and III’ programmes, which aimed to improve the management and response capacities of the MEDA\(^{51}\) countries in relation to the migratory phenomenon, stand out, as they strengthened the relationship between the countries by establishing dialogue and a cooperation framework on migration\(^{52}\).

Algeria benefits from regional technical cooperation projects carried out under the Support Programme for Democratic Governance Processes in the Maghreb and the Middle East: Masar Programme, funded by the AECID and implemented by the FIIAPP from 2012 to 2017\(^{53}\).

One delegated cooperation mechanism in which Spain is very active, especially through the FIIAPP, are the aforementioned EU twinning instruments. Spain has executed a twinning instrument in Algeria at least once in education and once to strengthen the expertise of the Algerian police.

### Table 4. FIIAPP programmes in the migration and mobility sector and Governance and modernisation of Public Administrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>Project name</th>
<th>Geographic scope</th>
<th>Start and end date</th>
<th>Sponsor</th>
<th>Total budget</th>
<th>Collaborating Spanish institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migration and mobility</td>
<td>MME – Africa - EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment</td>
<td>Algeria and 31 other African countries</td>
<td>01/01/2010-30/12/2013</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>€ 3.600.000</td>
<td>The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation (MAEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUROMED Migration II</td>
<td>12 MEDA countries</td>
<td>04/02/2008-03/02/2011</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>€ 4.994.000</td>
<td>GTZ, ICMPD, CIVI-POL, UNIV. SUSSEX EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW CENTER, CESPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUROMED Migrations III</td>
<td>9 MEDA countries</td>
<td>01/01/2012-30/05/2015</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>€5.000.000(^{54})</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance and modernisation of public administrations</td>
<td>Programme for the creation of standard indicators by sectors</td>
<td>Multi-country</td>
<td>01/09/2015-01/06/2016</td>
<td>AECID</td>
<td>€60.000</td>
<td>AECID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MASAR: Democratic Governance in the Arab World</td>
<td>Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Mauritania, Palestine, Tunisia, Libya.</td>
<td>01/11/2012-31/12/2017</td>
<td>AECID</td>
<td>€5.000.000</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation – (AECID)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{51}\) Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Palestinian territories, Tunisia and Turkey.

\(^{52}\) According to the FIIAPP website, the objective of EUROMED II (2008-2011), which covered Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, was to ‘improve the management and response capacities of MEDA countries in relation to the migratory phenomenon and to do so by promoting regular migration and reinforcing border controls to reduce irregular migration’.

EUROMED III (2012-2015) aimed to ‘strengthen cooperation between the Mediterranean countries and the countries of the European Union on migration issues, as well as South-South cooperation. To this end, irregular migration will be fought and border management and control will be strengthened’.


The Euromed programme was started in 2004.

\(^{53}\) It was difficult to find information on this project in AECID or FIIAPP reports or websites.

\(^{54}\) The budget does not appear on the FIIAPP website but does appear in its reports.

**REPORT** See: FIIAPP. 2013. (op. cit.) To learn more about the project, both the website and the report have a link to an ICMPD page that, as of 30 December 2021 had an error: [www.icmpd.org/EUROMED-Migration-III-1560.0.html](http://www.icmpd.org/EUROMED-Migration-III-1560.0.html)
It should be noted that in the case of Algeria, the FIIAPP projects in the area of ‘Security and the fight against organised Crime’—which in 2021 was renamed ‘Security, peace and development’—focus on two aspects: improving the capacity for response to natural disasters and biological threats and strengthening the capacity of security forces in the fight against terrorism, road safety and forensics. These projects thus create a link between development and security but leave migration outside the security sector, at least a priori.

c. Cooperation for financial development: Debt conversion agreements

As previously mentioned, the Ministries of Industry and Economy and Trade play a noteworthy role in the ODA allocated to Algeria due to the DAF credits accounted for as ODA, and the Development Promotion Funds (FONPRODE)\(^5\), by which the credit disbursement and reimbursement flows characterised aid to Algeria for years. Moreover, Spain has had a debt conversion agreement with Algeria since 2006\(^6\).

5. Migration, border management and conditionality

Migration is nothing new to Algeria: during the French mandate, in the first half of the 20th century, many men—especially Berbers from Kabylia—temporarily migrated to France for work. There was also a particularly large movement during World War I when Algerians joined the French army or went to work in French factories. Later, following independence, Algerians who supported the French and many other workers migrated to France. The tightening of French migration rules and Algeria’s decision to stop managing labour migration to France in the 1970s limits legal migration, reducing it essentially to family reunification\(^5\). In the 90s, during the civil war, new Algerian migration flows arose: many went to Tunisia on a tourist visa only to stay indefinitely, while others fled to Spain in search of asylum. Since then, irregular Algerian migration—the so-called harraga\(^58\)—has flowed continuously, varying in intensity depending on the socio-political and economic circumstances of the times\(^58\).

During the 2000s, many highly educated Algerians left for various destinations in search of specialised jobs.

Harraga is the popular term used in Algeria to describe people who migrate irregularly.

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\(^5\) After the OECD CAD questioned the effectiveness and real contribution to development of this type of tied aid, in the 2010 Law for the Reform of the Financial Support System for the Internationalization of Spanish Companies, the DAF was replaced with two new independent instruments: the Development Promotion Fund (FONPRODE), a development support instrument, and the Enterprise Internationalisation Fund (FIEM), related exclusively to trade. For more information: EMPRESA GLOBAL (2010). Nuevo instrumento financiero de apoyo a la internacionalización de la empresa española el FIEM. Op. Cit.


\(^6\) Article 5 of Law 38/2006, of 7 December; regulating external debt management establishes that ‘Spain will promote the efficient exercise of the Spanish conversion policy, consistent with the other development cooperation policy activities and with the framework of the international financial system’. Debt-in-investment conversion programmes transform the payment obligations that a country has contracted with its creditor into financing investments that promote its economic and social development and reduce poverty. TESORO. (web). Organisation. International matters. Foreign Debt Management. Bilateral management. https://tinyurl.com/2p9yut8j. The Conversion with Algeria Programme can be consulted here: https://www.tesoro.es/asuntos-internacionales/gestion-bilateral/programa/133/programa-de-conversion-de-deuda-externa-de-argelia-frente-espana-en-inversiones-publicas


\(^58\) Literally ‘those who burn’ in Algerian Arabic, the term refers to people who burn their documents to avoid being returned to their country.

\(^59\) Many of them are driven by the feeling of hogra: a feeling of structural injustice or oppression by the system.

The decline in Algerian migrations in 2019 may be partially explained by the hope for structural changes motivated by the start of the popular Hirak Movement. The realisation shortly thereafter that this change was not going to take place may have something to do with the pressing increase in migration in 2020 and 2021. BOUKHLEF, A. 26/10/2021. La déception après le hirak et la pandémie poussent de plus en plus d’Algériens à émigrer. Middle East Eye édition française. http://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/actu-et-enquetes/algerie-immigration-clandestine-hirak-espagne-coronavirus-frantex
As for Algeria’s status as a country of destination, it is important to point out that, after the war, there was a significant migration of people from Sub-Saharan Africa searching for farm and mine work, given the need for labour. During the 2000s, people of other nationalities (especially from China and Egypt) migrated legally to work in the construction and fuel sectors. The migration flow from Sub-Saharan Africa also continued for labour reasons, and Algeria served as a transit country to Libya or Europe. From 2011 to 2015, in the context of the conflict in Libya and the fragile situation in Tunisia after the Arab Spring, Algeria experienced an increase in the arrival of migrants from Central and West Africa. In recent years, Algeria has remained a country of origin, destination and transit for migrants to Europe. Its current migration policy is characterised by agreements with EU countries such as Spain regarding the readmission of Algerian nationals, its practices of detaining and deporting irregular migrants to Niger, and the defence of migration management without the interference of the EU.

5.1. Algeria as a country of origin: migration and refuge

In mid-2020, the UN estimated the number of Algerian migrants in the world to be 2,022,337. According to Eurostat data, there are 1,792,000 in the EU.

According to UNHCR data, that year, there were 4,576 Algerian refugees in the world. In the EU, more than 90% of asylum applications from Algerians are denied.

The Algerian population in Spain has increased progressively over recent years. Regarding asylum applications, Algerians have been among the top 15 nationalities with the most applications in Spain in recent years with a protection rate between 1% and 7%. In other words, over 90% of the applications are denied.

Regarding migrants in an irregular situation, the number of Algerians ‘illegally present’ in the EU has been increasing over the past four years (from 24,000 in 2017 to 38,000 in 2020). Frontex has also been detecting an increasingly larger number of Algerians since 2015 (see Graph 1), with a new peak in 2020. Algerians generally follow the route to Spain (Western Mediterranean) in the case of irregular migration; 11,457 arrivals were detected on this route in 2020, with similar figures in 2021.

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61 Regarding visas granted to Algerians to reside in the EU in recent years—some 35,000 per year—about 60% are granted for family matters, and 20% for education. (Only 4% to 7% are work visas.) EUROSTAT. Migration and migrant population statistics. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics


64 In 2020, 66,893 Algerians were registered in Spain. The figures have remained above 60,000 since 2011. From 1998 to 2004, there was a large increase, going from 4,544 to more than 46,000 respectively. See: National Statistics Institute (INE). Database.

65 This is an even lower figure than the aforementioned EU average, which would be between 5% and 7%. Of the 522 resolutions to applications from Algerian people in 2019, only eight were favourable (1%).

66 In 2020, of the 688 resolutions, 14 were favourable (2%). In 2021, there were 603 resolutions and 46 (7%) favourable. Informes ‘Asilo en Cifras’ (OAP) y Avance mensual de datos de protección internacional acumulados hasta diciembre de 2021. http://www.interior.gob.es/web/servicios-al-ciudadano/infraestructura-de-asilo-y-refugio/datos-e-informacion-estadistica

67 Gender-based violence and persecution for belonging to the LGBTIQ+ collective are the reasons why most Algerians obtain international protection.

68 The Western Mediterranean Route includes the land and maritime borders of Spain, but not including the Canary Islands. In 2020, 66% of the people detected on Western Mediterranean Route were Algerian nationals (11,457 people). Of all the Algerians detected, 86% were on that route. From January to November 2021, 12,360 people from Algeria were ‘detected’, with 87% of detections on the Western Mediterranean Route. Data extracted from the Frontex database. FRONTEX. Migratory map (excel). Detections of illegal border-crossings statistics download. Datos extraídos de la base de datos de Frontex. FRONTEX. Migratory map (excel). Detections of illegal border-crossings statistics download. https://frontex.europa.eu/we-know/migratory-map/
Moreover, in 2020 there were more than 8,000 interceptions by the Algerian coastguard\(^6\) and 4,704 people\(^7\) were intercepted from the start of 2021 until October (half in September\(^8\)).

Organisations and sociologists highlight the changing profile of these migrants in recent times: a new phenomenon of ‘family harraga’\(^9\) including women with babies, pregnant women and even people with disabilities. The danger they are willing to risk on these trips shows how desperate they are\(^9\).

In addition to the recent increase in arrivals to the EU of Algerians from Algeria and the growing family profile, there are other new trends taking place that could represent a turning point. On the one hand, several recent analyses warn of the consolidation of organised networks in the country\(^3\), people from sub-Saharan countries and other third countries would be embarking from Algeria instead of using it as a transit country to Morocco. In this sense, according to the civil society organisations interviewed, sub-Saharan people are beginning to organise their own trips from the coast of Algeria\(^3\).

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\(^7\) Returning to the detection graph, it is interesting to observe the decline in 2019, which experts link to the hopes raised after Bouteflika left the government in March 2019, and the strong rise the following year when these hopes had quickly been dashed and the socio-economic crisis resulting from COVID had deepened. See statements by sociologist Rabah Sbaa in MEE 10/26/2021. La déception après le hirak et la pandémie poussent plus en plus d’Algériens à émigrer. https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/actu-et-enquetes/algérie-immigration-clandestine-hirak-espagne-coronavirus-frontex


\(^9\) By the end of July 2020, more than 2,600 Algerians had arrived in Spain—a quarter of all migrants arriving by sea—, representing the main nationality of arrival. EL PAÍS, 11/08/2020. "En Argelia ya no nos queda nada" https://elpais.com/espana/2020-08-10/en-argelia-ya-no-nos-queda-nada.html

\(^3\) According to the UNODC, Algerian emigrants traditionally prepared their own trips, bought a boat among acquaintances and jumped into the sea, but intermediaries are gaining ground. They offer better-prepared boats that cover the route in a few hours and manage to organize simultaneous departures that overwhelm the local and Spanish authorities. From 26 to 27 July, more than 700 migrants arrived in Murcia and Almería in this fashion: UNODC Observatory on Smuggling of Migrants. 20 May 2021 WEST AFRICA, NORTH AFRICA AND THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN Key Findings on the Characteristics of Migrant Smuggling in West Africa, North Africa and the Central Mediterranean https://www.unodc.org/res/som/docs/Observatory_Storymap_1_Final_2021.05.19.pdf

\(^4\) Especially since March 2021, according to reports from the civil society organisations in Algeria and Spain. This would include Moroccans who, after the tightening of controls in their country, went to Algeria to make the trip.

\(^5\) According to information from an expert civil society organisation interviewed under the scope of this project.
Internment and expulsion of Algerians

Along with Morocco, Algeria stands out as the country of origin with the most expulsion orders from the EU. At the same time, it has one of the lowest rates of return: 5\%\textsuperscript{v}. In this regard, it should be noted that in 2002 the Council of the EU authorised the European Commission to negotiate a readmission agreement with Algeria that has not yet been signed.

As for Spain, there are several figures showing that the Algerian nationality is the second highest in internments in recent years\textsuperscript{vii} but data on people actually expelled is not available\textsuperscript{viii} (although various sources indicate that expulsions are carried out periodically, including by sea)\textsuperscript{vii}. Expulsions from Spain are carried out in accordance with the 2004 readmission agreement\textsuperscript{iv}.

5.2. Algeria as a country of destination and transit: the situation of migrants and refugees in Algeria

As a country of destination and transit for migrants and refugees, according to a UN report\textsuperscript{v}, in mid-2020 there were 250,378 immigrants in Algeria, representing 0.6\% of its population, a figure that has remained stable since at least 2005\textsuperscript{v}.

According to UNHCR, the refugee population in Algeria as of 31 December 2021 comprised 98,129 people: 90,000 Saharawis in refugee camps, and some 41 nationalities in the urban population\textsuperscript{vii}, to which 2,626 asylum seekers must be added, also under this mandate\textsuperscript{vii}. From 2005 to 2018, the number of refugees remained almost steady, increasing in 2019 (see table and graphs in Annex I).


\textsuperscript{vii} Algeria has readmission agreements with Spain, Italy, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. GLOBAL DETENTION PROJECT. (2020). Country Report Immigration Detention in Algeria: Pandemic Pushbacks. https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/africa/algeria

\textsuperscript{v} SPANISH ATTORNEY GENERAL. (2020) Report to the government of SM presented at the beginning of the judicial year by the State Attorney General, Hon. Dolores Delgado García, Madrid.

\textsuperscript{iv} Standing out among the refugees are those from Syria (6,946), Yemen (266), Palestine (203), Mali (188) and Cameroon (141).

\textsuperscript{v} DSince 1975, Algeria has welcomed the most Saharawi refugees. There is no individual record of these people, who are in camps in the Tindouf area, but, as of June 2021, the UNHCR estimates there are more than 90,000 most vulnerable Saharawi refugees, although the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance is much greater than this figure. See: UNHCR. Update Report. 1 Jan-30 Jun. 2021. Algeria. https://reporting.unhcr.org/document/618

\textsuperscript{vii} Expulsions from Spain are carried out in accordance with the 2004 readmission agreement\textsuperscript{iv}.

\textsuperscript{v} Mostly from Guinea (410), Cameroon (387), Mali (353), Nigeria (271) and Ivory Coast (230). UNHCR. Refugee Data Finder. https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/

\textsuperscript{v} As for Spain, there are several figures showing that the Algerian nationality is the second highest in internments in recent years but data on people actually expelled is not available (although various sources indicate that expulsions are carried out periodically, including by sea). Expulsions from Spain are carried out in accordance with the 2004 readmission agreement.
5.2.1. Legal framework on migration and asylum

Table 5. Legal framework for migrants and IP applicants or refugees in Algeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International instruments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 and its protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (although has not signed the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa of 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families of 1990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Algeria is not a signatory to the 2009 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National legislation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Constitution of Algeria (arts. 50 and 81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Law No. 08-11 governing foreign nationals’ conditions of entry, stay and circulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Law 9-01 of 2009 amending the Criminal Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Law 81-10 governing the conditions of employment of foreign workers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Article 44 of Law No. 8 –11 of June 2008 establishes that irregular immigration is a criminal offense punishable by six months to two years in prison and a fine. It also sets forth expulsion procedures for migrants. Article 42 condemns failure to comply with an expulsion order with up to five years in prison unless it is impossible to return. In addition, this law establishes that, to be considered in a legal situation, foreigners must enter the country with a travel document and a valid visa and keep it valid to maintain that status.

On the other hand, Law 9-01 of 2009 introduced in the Algerian Criminal Code a sentence of up to six months and/or a fine for any national or foreigner who leaves the country ‘illegally’.86

Law 81-10 of 1981 establishes that work permits for foreigners are only allowed for positions that cannot be filled by an Algerian national.

Regarding asylum and refuge, despite having ratified the Geneva Convention, its protocol and other international instruments for the protection of refugees and stateless persons, there are no specific national regulations on this matter beyond a 1963 decree that established the creation of the Office for Refugees and Stateless Persons, but which has never been put into operation.

Only the Constitution includes several guarantees related to the rights of foreigners (such as the right to property) and specifically of refugees, establishing that a person who is a beneficiary of the right of asylum cannot be ‘deported’ or extradited (art 50).89

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87 This ‘illegal’ form includes fraudulent means (identity theft, forged documents, etc.) and leaving the country without passing through border posts. Algerian Criminal Code. Article 175 bis 1. [https://www.joradp.dz/trv/fpenal.pdf](https://www.joradp.dz/trv/fpenal.pdf)

According to an expert researcher interviewed for this report, this criminalisation of the nationals’ migration exists in other Maghreb countries and is not usually applied. In the case of Algeria, the people would be interrogated, brought before the courts and sentenced, although without carrying out the prison sentence, according to a civil society organisation with expertise in Algeria.

As for the authorities, the coastguards regularly report the arrest of dozens of potential illegal migrants: in 2020, the navy reported it had intercepted more than 8,000. Middle East Eye (MEE). 26/10/2021. French edition. [https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/actu-et-enquetes/algerie-immigration-clandestine-hirak-espagne-coronavirus-fronter/7bcidwvARslvDZrYzv_Yvz21CMYtvWz1wovQFCrRvXVW2ypga3pGzexMv4AKO6AdvBF5yOg](https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/actu-et-enquetes/algerie-immigration-clandestine-hirak-espagne-coronavirus-fronter/7bcidwvARslvDZrYzv_Yvz21CMYtvWz1wovQFCrRvXVW2ypga3pGzexMv4AKO6AdvBF5yOg)


89 Article 50 of the Algerian [https://www.joradp.dz/TRV/FCansi.pdf](https://www.joradp.dz/TRV/FCansi.pdf)
Regarding the care offered to applicants for international protection or refugees, there is a draft of a law on asylum developing a national asylum system but which has not been approved and on which no progress has been made to date\(^9\). According to several civil society sources interviewed, a law of this type is rejected because it could be seen as an attempt by Europe to transfer responsibility to Algeria to take care of migrants.

5.2.2. Assistance and support for migrants and refugees

Currently, it is the UNHCR office in Algiers that registers asylum seekers and refugees and conducts refugee status determination (RSD) interviews\(^{91}\). Their status is not automatically recognised by the Algerian authorities and UNHCR registration does not grant them a residence permit\(^{92}\).

The government has made no efforts to improve the situation of migrants in general and even prohibits the existence of organisations aimed at assisting them\(^{93}\): Despite the commitment announced by Abdelmajid Tebboune to guarantee sub-Saharan migrants appropriate reception and to regularise their situation, after being appointed prime minister in May 2017, Algeria has not carried out any reform regarding the regularisation of immigrants. On the contrary, a xenophobic\(^{94}\) discourse has been developing and intensified when Ahmed Ouyahia became prime minister in August of 2017\(^{95}\).

This narrative by the authorities encouraged the public expansion of hate speech already present on social networks\(^{96}\) that blamed sub-Saharan people for the spread of HIV or for taking jobs away from Algerians\(^{97}\) and was reflected in political actions, with Algeria taking on the role of expelling country of migrants detected in its territory.

5.2.3. Arrests and expulsions in Algeria

The fight against illegal immigration and the creation of a security zone is one of the objectives of the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) with Algeria and of the Association agreement with the EU in force since 2005.

Since fall of 2005, Algeria has carried out hundreds of expulsions of sub-Saharan migrants to neighbouring countries\(^{98}\). However, the practice of mass expulsions was established in summer 2014,
when the number of Nigeriens traveling to Algeria increased (especially women and children who went to beg) - and an agreement was signed with Niger in December of that year to repatriate undocumented Nigeriens detected in the country. In 2016, the authorities intensified these procedures, including asylum seekers and refugees from other West African countries such as Mali, Guinea and Cameroon and forcibly transporting them to the southern borders of Algeria. In summer 2017, the number of expulsions reached a level never before seen: from August of that year until the end of 2018, the authorities launched a campaign against migrants to expel more than 34,550, affecting people in all situations, including those with valid visas, consular documentation and several hundred asylum seekers and refugees. In its 2019 annual report, the National Council of Human Rights (CNDH), an official Algerian body equivalent to the Ombudsman, stated that 36,866 people had been deported, according to information from the Algerian National Security.

The mass detentions and expulsions of migrants from Algeria to Niger and Mali continued in 2020 despite border closures and health risks caused by COVID. From January to September, more than 16,000 people were expelled to Niger: approximately 8,900 Nigeriens, in so-called convoys (official repatriation buses or trucks) - and the rest –of more than 20 different nationalities- were returned unofficially, being abandoned in the desert, in the border area between Algeria and Niger.

On 1 October 2020, the Algerian Minister of the Interior announced a new national strategy to fight illegal migration, declaring that Algeria respected human rights and highlighting that they were working with the IOM to ‘ensure adequate conditions for repatriation operations’. However, according to information collected by Human Rights Watch through humanitarian workers in Niger and other organisations such as Alarm Phone Sahara, this was not the case: in 2021 these expulsions continued, reaching over 22,127 people by the end of November.

Refugees and asylum seekers are still being included among detained and expelled migrants.

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99 Among them, in 2017, women and children were repatriated for ‘giving a negative image of Niger abroad’. Both the Nigerian and Algerian authorities said that this type of migration was organised by criminal networks. That being the case, Amnesty International points out that these people should have been considered potential victims of trafficking and, thus, should have been offered the possibility of international protection. On the contrary, the Algerian authorities carried out mass arrests and expulsions to Niger of thousands of undocumented Nigerien migrants, first women and minors and later workers. AI (2018). Ibid.

100 This agreement is not public, and there are even doubts as to whether it was ever written up. See: UN. 2019 1st Visit to the Niger Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants. https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/HRC/41/38/Add.1

What does seem clear is that it would not cover non-Nigerians. In fact, since 2018, Niger has been complaining about non-nationals being returned to its country. See: RFI. 22/02/2018. Expulsions of Nigeriens d’Algérie à Agadez, le ministre de l’Intérieur réagit https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20180222-expulsions-algerie-niger-migrants-minis-tre-interieur-bazoum-mohamed-proteste

101 In December 2016, security forces arrested some 1,500 sub-Saharans in Algiers and expelled hundreds to Niger (including asylum seekers) without following any legal procedure or guarantee. https://www.msf.org/deportations-put-migrants%E2%80%99-lives-risk-niger


103 Some of the latter were released after UNHCR intervened, others managed to escape, but many others were deported to Niger and Mali. AI (2018). Op. cit. pag.4.


105 HRW. 2020 (op.cit.)

106 In those cases, the Algerian military took most of their belongings including documentation, abandoning them in a location called ‘Point Zero’ and ordering them to walk 15 km in extreme weather conditions towards Assamaka, the closest city in Niger. Medecins Sans Frontieres. 20/04/2021. Deportations put migrants’ lives at risk in Niger https://www.msf.org/deportations-put-migrants%E2%80%99-lives-risk-niger

107 APS. 02/11/ 2020 (op.cit.)


It is worth remembering that, although each country can regulate the entry of foreigners, Algeria’s treatment of migrants goes against its obligations as a signatory of the AU’s Migrant Workers Convention of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Banjul Charter) (art. 12) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (art.13), which prohibits collective expulsions and requires an individual examination of each case. Furthermore, as a signatory to the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, the Convention against Torture, the Refugee Convention and other legal instruments, Algeria should comply with the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits forced return to countries where people may suffer torture or threats to their lives or freedom. With the expulsion of refugees and asylum seekers, Algeria even contravenes its own Law No. 08-11, which in article 33 includes the suspension of the expulsion of people who are unable to return, and its constitution, which in article 50 recognises the right of asylum.

Detention centres

According to Amnesty International and the Global Detention Project, there are centres where migrants are detained—sometimes for months—at least in the cities of Oran, Tamanrasset, Zeralda (Algiers), Blida, Bir el Dijr (Oran), and Reggane.

Raids are conducted on the streets, in homes and workplaces and include women and minors.

In its 2018 report, Amnesty International explained that, prior to being expelled, security forces held migrants and refugees at a facility run by the Algerian Red Crescent that had been converted into an informal detention centre, known as Zeralda, where they awaited deportation to the south.

In Oran, the migrants were taken to Bir El Djir, a centre managed by the Red Crescent and guarded by the gendarmes a few kilometres from the city, where they would wait one to three days before being expelled. Tamanrasset it is the main departure point for convoys to Niger.

These and other detention places are controlled by the Algerian authorities. In any case, according to reports from various NGOs (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Global Detention Project, Medecins Sans Frontieres, etc.) and migrants and asylum seekers interviewed for this report, the Algerian authorities refused to grant detained migrants any opportunity for legal recourse.

5.3. Conditionality in migration

Algeria’s position on migration changed especially after 2002, with the start of the 5+5 dialogue. Dialogue meetings on migration, the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU that same year and events such as the entry, and attempted entry of large numbers of people headed to Morocco. Spain

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110 Article 32 of Law 8-11 establishes the possibility of appealing the expulsion resolution and allows the foreigner pending deportation to contact the diplomatic representation of their country and receive the assistance of a lawyer and interpreter.

111 The ‘5+5 Dialogue’ or ‘Western-Mediterranean Forum’ is considered the first forum for enhanced cooperation between the two shores of the Mediterranean. It was established in Rome in 1990 as a Trans-Mediterranean Forum and a security initiative to achieve stronger cooperation between 5 EU and 5 Maghreb countries (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain) through political dialogue and economic cooperation and by promoting more efficient management of resources as a way to increase interdependence and regional development. Its areas of activity are information exchange, joint management of international borders, labour migration, migration for development and protection of the rights of migrants in the Western Mediterranean region. See: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/dialogue-migration-western_en. and http://www.exteriores.gob.es/portal/es/politicaexteriorcooperacion/mediterraneo/paginas/otrosprocesos.aspx The migration dialogue was initiated in 2002. https://www.iom.int/es/dialogo-55-sobre-migracion-en-el-mediterraneo-occidental


and the EU used these milestones to request that Algeria get involved in controlling the borders in the Maghreb and in the fight against trafficking networks.

Traditionally, Algeria argued that it was not concerned about its status as a transit country for migration, even though practically all migrants who arrived in Morocco did so after first passing through Algeria. This nonchalance was based on the official public discourse claiming that Algeria is more a country of destination than transit for sub-Saharan migrants and –one of the keys to this discourse being the desire to distance itself from Morocco’s position– migrants more inclined to work with European countries.

The Algerian authorities do not want to give the impression of a lack of solidarity with sub Saharan Africa, especially when -as several of the specialists interviewed reminded us- Algeria has hoped to boast a position of African leadership. Admittedly, Algerian foreign policy does pay special attention to the situation in the Sahel and Mali (especially regarding terrorism and organised crime) and Libya, as it is based on the classic axes of the Western Sahara, relations with Morocco, the intensification of relations with its other neighbours in the Maghreb and a preponderant role in the African Union (AU).

It is clear that whatever the relevant situation is between Algeria and Morocco at any given time –as well as the relations that any third party (whether a Member State, the EU in general or otherwise) has with Morocco- it will have repercussions on negotiations with Algeria.

For example, Algeria was not part of the Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development in Rabat in July 2006 (which led to the Rabat process). According to specialists, Algeria’s absence was largely explained by the continuous focus on the good cooperation and relations between Spain and Morocco, as well as its desire to distance itself from the image of being country of origin and transit for migration, as this clashed with its official discourse.

In addition to this desire to distinguish itself from Morocco, we can assume Algeria was likely interested in defending its autonomy in migration management: faced with the logic of conditionality and dependence on Morocco, Algeria wished to demonstrate its ability to manage its affairs autonomously.

The specialists on Algeria and the civil society organisations interviewed for this report nonetheless suspect the existence of European influence in Algeria’s management of the migration, although to a much lesser extent than in the case of its neighbour Morocco. One of the researchers interviewed attributes this lesser influence to ‘the great capacity of control over its country, its economic weight and the enormous amount of natural resources it possesses’.

According to this same source, ‘Algeria would have risked less at the European level with the issue of migration than Morocco, Tunisia or Libya; [Algeria] has worked more directly with Member States, such as Italy, connecting interests such as gas agreements and the economy, not pressing to receive European funds, but more as an internal issue’. As we have seen, in the field of European development cooperation, the EUTF essentially does not affect Algeria, focusing on relatively recent regional programmes (2017) and with relatively non-sizeable sums.

114 Ibid.
115 In this sense, Algeria’s position regarding the G5 Sahel initiative has evolved, moving from one of clear opposition because it felt excluded from the initiative in its area of influence to not being openly opposed to it, although maintaining its stance against it.
116 As a member of the AU, it is worth noting Algeria’s participation in the Nouakchott process, the presence in Algiers of the headquarters of AFRIPOL and the African Centre for the Study & Research on Terrorism (CAERT), an agency dependent on the African Union and focused on the study and monitoring of terrorism related issues in Africa.
Algeria is currently an observer country, together with Libya.
Despite all this, the ‘self-management’ discourse around migration is still present in recent years. An example is the statements by Hassan Kacimi, Director of Migration at the Algerian Ministry of the Interior, who said during the conference on the Global Compact for Migration organised in Marrakech in 2018 that ‘it is up to each country to establish its public migration public policy’, adding that ‘Algeria will not make any concessions when it comes to making its borders secure’\textsuperscript{119}. That same year, when asked about the possible opening of holding areas/detention centres or ports of disembarkation in Algeria for immigrants returned from Europe, Nouredine Bedoui, Minister of the Interior, stated that as the Foreign Minister had already indicated, Algeria excluded that possibility\textsuperscript{120}.

EThis position of autonomy is diluted when we look at the statements of both Spanish and Algerian authorities in their different meetings. For example, the President of the Spanish Government after the Spanish-Algerian summit in October 2020, stated that, in relation to immigration, conversations with the Algerian Government were very positive and that both countries share the idea that it is a “joint challenge that not only corresponds to countries that receive this migration, but also to countries of transit and [...] of origin of migration”. He also pointed out that it was necessary to focus not only on “a security dimension” but also to create opportunities and economic development “so that young and not so young people do not decide to leave their countries”. Finally, he stressed that the path of reinforced cooperation in the field of migration, the fight against irregular immigration, but also legal migration is very fruitful and that, in this sense, the two countries were going to start working “immediately”\textsuperscript{121}.

In March 2021, at a meeting between the then Minister of Foreign Affairs and her Algerian counterpart, the Spanish ministry underlined Algeria’s role as a ‘strategic partner’ and the effective and close cooperation that the countries maintain on issues ‘as sensitive’ as migration flows and the fight against terrorism, working ‘together to improve the socioeconomic conditions and stability of these countries to prevent an increase in illegal immigration flows through Algeria to our country’. For his part, her Algerian counterpart vindicated his country as a ‘solid and reliable partner’, expressing the hope that economic relations between the two countries would deepen and adding that Algeria ‘has never failed in its commitments’ in migration with Spain despite the world situation and the ‘pressure’ it face.\textsuperscript{122}

The mention of being a reliable partner, united in the express desire to improve economic relations, strongly suggests the possibility or capacity of both parties to predetermine or claim certain prerogatives to act in such a way that benefits Spain.


\textsuperscript{120} APS. 15/07/2018. L’Algérie n’acceptera pas l’implantation de centres pour les migrants clandestins. https://www.aps.dz/algérie/76271-l-algerie-n-acceptera-pas-l-implantation-de-centres-pour-les-migrants-clandestins


At that same summit, the two governments agreed on the need to fight human trafficking, being, according to Sánchez, ‘in favour of cooperation, of collaboration, [launching] a very, very forceful message, as we are doing, against irregular migration, against the mafias that traffic precisely in human beings and that put people’s lives at risk. Many people die in the Mediterranean as a result of mafias and human trafficking’. Ibid.


At that meeting, both countries agreed to work to open ‘regular’ and ‘orderly’ channels of legal immigration to Spain for entrepreneurs, students, and workers, while both countries jointly seek to stop the arrival of irregular immigrants, especially from countries in the Sahel. The Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs underlined the importance of facilitating regular ‘human flows’ to control irregular migration, something that, according to his Spanish counterpart, will be carried out just as it has been done up to now: “You don’t have to change the recipe”\textsuperscript{119}.
We must remain aware of how the political and migration situation in Algeria evolves in the near future, including its bilateral interactions with the EU countries, the EU itself and the countries of the region, especially Morocco. Moreover, we must consider the latter’s relations with the EU and each of the member states and Algeria’s perception of them in order to verify whether migration becomes a bargaining chip in cooperation, economic and diplomatic relations.

6. CONCLUSIONS

- Algeria is a priority country for migration issues both for the EU and Spain. However, these issues have very residual significance in development cooperation. At the EU level, it is reflected in projects funded under the European Neighbourhood Policy and a small number of regional projects funded by the EUTF that include Algeria, some in the field of migration but unrelated to border control issues, as so desired by Algeria.

- Regarding Algeria’s weight in Spanish Development Cooperation, it is interesting to note that, despite having lost its 2002 status as priority country in the 2013 Master Plan for Cooperation, the country has received ODA for an amount similar to or greater than that disbursed to some priority countries. This is due to the accounting of items allocated to Algerians in Spain as ODA, which represents a distortion of the aid.

- Over the course of our research, we have not identified any clear elements of conditionality of European and Spanish development aid for migration control. In any case, it is important to bear in mind that conditionality may not be easily visible and may not only be related to monetary items for development cooperation but to other aspects such as investments, geostrategic alignments, or diplomatic relations. All this can have an impact when it comes to conditioning migration strategies and policies.

- Throughout this research, we experienced serious difficulties in obtaining information on migration agreements and commitments with the country, as well as specific data related to budgetary issues and expulsions and internments, which denotes a serious lack of transparency on these issues. Moreover, it is worth noting the difficulty we had in obtaining information from the Algerian civil society, which is severely threatened, punished, and persecuted in the exercise of freedom of association and expression. Nor did we receive a response to our interview request from the Spanish cooperation office in Algeria.

- Regarding the future of relations, it must be considered that Algeria’s position in migration management, the EU’s and that of member countries could be affected not only by the recent increased arrival of Algerians to the EU, but above all by the possibility of it becoming consolidated as a place of embarkation for people from third countries, as the return agreements signed with different member countries do not include their return.
### I. EVOLUTION OF THE NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION SEEKERS, REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS IN ALGERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>REFUGEES under UHNCR’s mandate</th>
<th>ASYLUM SEEKERS</th>
<th>ASYLUM APPLICATIONS</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>REFUGEES under UHNCR’s mandate</th>
<th>ASYLUM SEEKERS</th>
<th>ASYLUM APPLICATIONS</th>
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<td>309</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>2011</td>
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<td>717</td>
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<td>2021*</td>
<td>97,810</td>
<td>2,282</td>
<td>967</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own creation based on UNHCR data\(^{123}\) (until June 2021)

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**Number of Refugees, asylum seekers and asylum applications per year in Algeria**

![Graph showing the number of Refugees, asylum seekers and asylum applications per year in Algeria](image)

Own creation based on UNHCR data\(^{124}\)

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124 Ibid.
Number of asylum-seekers and asylum application per year in Algeria

![Graph showing the number of asylum-seekers and asylum applications in Algeria over the years.](image)

Own creation based on UNHCR data

ASYLUM-SEEKERS AND REFUGEES UNDER UHNCR’S MANDATE

![Graph showing the number of asylum-seekers and refugees under UHNCR’s mandate over the years.](image)

Elaboración propia a partir de datos ACNUR

125 Ibid.

126 Ibid.
II. MONTHLY DETECTIONS OF ALGERIANS ON THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN ROUTE.

Own creation based on Frontex data
BIBLIOGRAPHY:


